Delaying pension claims: a comprehensive examination of normal pension age, financial incentives, and work opportunities

Tomoki Kitamura, Kunio Nakashima

In aging societies, sustaining retirement income is a key policy challenge. Delaying public pension claims can mitigate longevity risk, especially for individuals with longer‐than‐average life expectancy or continued work capacity. Using survey‐based experiments targeting Japanese workers aged 40–59, we evaluate policies to encourage delayed claiming. We examine three financial incentives—tax disincentives for early retirement, actuarially fair lump‐sum payments, and steeper actuarial adjustments—with and without work opportunities beyond age 65. We also assess raising the normal pension age (NPA) from 65 to 67, distinguishing statutory from framing‐based increases. Raising the NPA is most effective, delaying claims by 1.1 years on average. Work opportunities delay claims by 0.5 years, while financial incentives alone have limited effects. Packages combining a framed NPA reference age, work opportunities, and steeper adjustments may offer a politically feasible alternative to a statutory NPA increase.

Journal of Risk and Insurance

John Wiley & Sons, Inc

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https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.70073

https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.70073